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Abstract
Media scholars have studied and critiqued search engines – and in particular the 
dominant commercial actor, Google – for over a decade. Several conceptual and 
methodological problems, such as a lack of technological transparency, have made 
a detailed analysis of concrete power relations and their effects difficult. This paper 
argues that a microeconomic approach can aid media scholars in examining the complex 
interactions that underpin the dynamics of information visibility unfolding around the 
Google search engine. Using the concept of a ‘three-sided market’, we characterize the 
business model built around google.com as the foundation of the company’s success. 
We then argue that the combination of search and advertising services, and in particular 
advertising network services, creates powerful incentives to orient the results page in 
self-serving ways, leading to fundamental conflicts of interest exacerbated by Google’s 
dominant position in both markets. Based on search engines’ mass media-like capacity 
to shape public discourse, we consider the identification of economic forces both as 
a prerequisite for a robust critique of the current situation and as a starting point for 
thinking about regulatory measures.
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Introduction
Scholars from humanities and the social sciences have studied search engines that for-
age the Web, index it and make it navigable through queries since the late 1990s (Introna 
and Nissenbaum, 2000). The principal thrust of these analyses has been the question of 
how these machines function as media – that is, how they orchestrate access to resources 
for understanding, debating and acting in the world. The particular fashion in which this 
is done, most importantly the selecting and ranking of results, has been considered 
crucial to how the Web contributes to political life in a large sense, both as a means of 
finding information and as a space for expression and deliberation. Search engines have 
consequently been framed as ‘gatekeepers’ (Diaz, 2008; Machill et al., 2008; Röhle, 
2009), as a ‘public good’ (Goldman, 2010) and as ‘capable of shaping public discourse 
itself’ (Grimmelmann, 2010: 456), and have been analysed in terms of power, fairness, 
monopoly and so on. There have been at least four methodological and conceptual dif-
ficulties in these studies, however.
First, the complex technology behind search engines, the huge quantities of data 
involved and the permanent battle waged against manipulation have made large-scale 
empirical analysis impracticable. Our knowledge of algorithms and data structures is 
largely conjectural and digital methods-based approaches (Rogers, 2004) are constantly 
obstructed by search providers. Second, scholars have struggled with adapting tradi-
tional concepts from media critique, such as bias or manipulation, to a configuration 
that organizes selection and evaluation procedures very differently than newsroom 
debates or editorial conferences. While humans are certainly responsible for ‘editorial’ 
decisions (Goldman, 2010: 462), these decisions are mainly expressed in the form of 
software which thoroughly transforms the ways in which procedures are imagined, dis-
cussed, implemented and managed. We are, in a sense, closer to statistics than to jour-
nalism when it comes to bias in Web search. The current debate on ‘search neutrality’, 
in which scholars, lawyers and lawmakers are attempting to define what ‘fairness’, 
‘abuse’ or ‘discrimination’ could actually mean in this context, again shows how chal-
lenging the transfer of concepts from traditional mass-media critique can be 
(Grimmelmann, 2010). Third, the surface similarities between the business models of 
traditional media and Web search can be deceiving: while advertising indeed accounts 
for virtually all revenues collected by Google, the dominant actor and the focus of this 
article, the specific way in which business relations are organized implies very different 
configurations of both practice and power. Fourth, the larger economic embedding of 
Web search has become perplexing: Google offers a number of services that we would 
certainly qualify as ‘mass-media related’ (YouTube, Google Books, Google News, 
etc.), but also operates an online office suite, two operating systems, a cloud hosting 
service, two social networking sites, an email platform and a hardware manufacturer 
(Motorola). Google and other Internet companies defy familiar lines of industry 
segmentation, which poses significant analytical challenges.
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In this article, we show how a close reading of ‘Googlenomics’ (Levy, 2009) can lead 
to a better understanding of the power relations crystallizing around Web search in light 
of these difficulties. While Google’s business model is certainly unusual, it has the 
advantage of being well documented and having received considerable attention from 
economists.1 Although the latter do not necessarily share the preoccupations of media 
scholars, we believe that a precise analysis of market configurations – and possible con-
flicts of interest – is necessary to assess certain political challenges, as well as to set the 
stage for possible responses in terms of regulation. In this sense, we hope to contribute 
to a political economy analysis of Web search (Van Couvering, 2008), but we focus on a 
microeconomic perspective rather than the more common macroeconomic approach.
Despite the many papers on search published by microeconomists (see Taylor, 2012: 
2–4), these texts are rarely referenced in the emerging field of ‘Web search studies’ 
(Zimmer, 2010). Considering the often narrow focus and prevalence of mathematical 
modelling in microeconomics (Varian, 2010), this (mutual) indifference is somewhat 
understandable; we hope to show, however, that there is much to be gained from doing 
away with it. To accomplish this, we introduce microeconomic concepts and language as 
analytical means, starting out by describing Google schematically in terms of its business 
model and outlining a number of implications. Building on this groundwork, our main 
contribution is then to develop an interdisciplinary argument that shows how Google’s 
combination of search and advertisement activities, in particular as an advertising net-
work, creates conflicts of interest and incentives to bias result rankings that are more 
complex and, in many ways, more problematic than the issues identified by traditional 
critiques of advertisement in mass media. This situation is aggravated by a monopoly 
position that appears, through a microeconomic lens, not simply as a historical accident, 
but rather as a structural effect of the way in which the search market is currently organ-
ized. In short, the purpose of this text is to introduce microeconomic reasoning into a 
media scholarly analysis and critique of Web search by applying it to one instance of the 
leading Internet company’s staggering multiplication of activities.
The argument proceeds in three steps: first, we use the concept of a ‘multi-sided mar-
ket’ to examine the complex constellation of actors positioned around Google’s search 
engine and to portray the company’s advertisement services as part of a techno-economic 
approach to organizing market interactions and, consequently, the dynamics of informa-
tion visibility online. Second, building on this analysis, we discuss the economic incen-
tives to ‘orient’ search results in self-serving ways which follow from Google’s double 
role as both search and advertisement business. Third, we present the company’s domi-
nant position in both markets as an expected consequence of the economic structures in 
place. We conclude by arguing in favour of a stronger consideration of microeconomic 
work in critical media scholarship, in particular when it comes to thinking about grounds, 
arguments and directions for regulation.
A three-sided market
The basic exchange structure of Web search consists of users querying the engine to find 
information made available by content providers competing for attention; advertisers 
hoping to grow their visitor numbers or sales finance the system. The results page is the 
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visible outcome of a dynamic procedure of ‘query-results-ads matching’ (QRAM), which 
we define as the ensemble of complex interactions between these actors taking place 
every time a search is launched: a user enters a query and thereby initiates the production 
of an ordered list of ‘organic’ results (‘left side’) and, if advertisers are targeting the 
query or its semantic neighbourhood, an ordered list of ‘sponsored’ ads (‘right side’), 
which are served together on a single page. This matching between a particular query, 
particular results and particular ads implies a dense network of technical, communica-
tional and economic transactions, some of which are happening in real time, and draws 
together a large set of fundamentally heterogeneous contributions. Latour’s (2005: 199–
204) critique of the seeming ‘localness’ of face-to-face interactions provides a valuable 
means to conceptualize the complexities involved in the QRAM process.
The QRAM
First, the QRAM is not isotopic, in the sense that different actors from different places 
contribute to the final result; wide networks of users, content providers, advertisers, 
engineers, managers, algorithms and so on weigh on every page generated. Second, it is 
not synchronic, because contributions are made at different times and imply different 
durations. The query, the contents, the architecture of the system, etc. – each element 
refers to its own temporality and labour investment. Third, the QRAM is not synoptic, 
because actors operate at varying levels of visibility. While search results and advertise-
ments clearly point to the contributions of content providers and advertisers, neither the 
indexing and search mechanisms nor the elaborate ad-matching machinery are discern-
ible at the surface. Fourth, the interaction is not homogeneous, because even a fully digi-
tized information environment allows for numerous forms of materiality and agency; 
typing a query is not the same thing as writing a ranking algorithm. Fifth, the QRAM is 
not isobaric, because actors press with varying intensity into the process. The force and 
capacity to shape outcomes is not only unequally distributed between the principal actor 
groups organizing around a search engine – users, content providers, advertisers – but 
also inside these groups themselves: particularly well informed and skilful users have 
more control over result sets, content providers with higher spending on search engine 
optimization (SEO) will rank higher and advertisers with bigger budgets can attract 
more visitors. The interactions making up the QRAM are also in constant evolution 
because actors are learning how to maximize their gains: users become competent at 
phrasing queries, content providers learn about user interests and ranking procedures, 
advertisers develop skills in designing campaigns and Google itself constantly develops 
both its platform and its capacity to extract profits from it.
Three observations are crucial here: first, while these five points apply to almost any 
kind of interaction, the QRAM is characterized by a high degree of mechanization on 
all levels. Technological expertise, including both engineering and management-of-
engineering skills, is decisive and Google is very successful in shifting interactions and 
negotiations with other actors onto the technological level: information crawlers, self-
service interfaces, automated price-setting, quantified ranking, and similar are Google’s 
means to approach its business relations as engineering problems. In a sense, the 
company is the technology-focused shark in a pond of content-focused fish. Second, 
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mechanization affects how ‘information politics’ – the ‘mediated versioning of reality’ 
(Rogers, 2004: 163) – play out in practice. In the context of ‘big data’, information is 
not managed through the conceptual and normative frameworks of journalistic practice 
or political deliberation but in terms of statistical ensembles, network centralities and 
frequencies of every kind (words, views, clicks, links, etc.). We simply cannot approach 
a search engine with the same critical toolset as we would use for, say, Fox News. But 
as scholars have argued (Zimmer, 2010), the political, ethical and cultural challenges 
posed by search engines are equally relevant to democracy if ‘search engines are the 
new mass media’ (Grimmelmann, 2010: 456). Third, if we accept that economic moti-
vations are decisive in actors’ decisions, we arrive at a level of analysis that can make 
the enormous complexities somewhat more manageable. While ‘Googlenomics’ are far 
from banal, studying them adds to an analysis of the concrete power relations (Röhle, 
2009) developing around the dominant search engine. The microeconomic perspective 
we are advocating should, however, not be taken as a replacement for other approaches; 
rather, it should be seen as an extension that is supported by the observation that, while 
Google’s technological parameters are essentially opaque, their business practices and 
relationships are to a large extent documented and traceable. What this form of analysis 
can provide is not a ‘smoking gun’ in the form of concrete cases of ‘bias’ or ‘discrimina-
tion’, but a framework for identifying and analysing conflicts of interest – areas where 
economic motivations exert pressure to act in ways that can be qualified as harmful in 
a ‘mass-media’ interpretation of Web search, such as when considering the distribution 
of visibility to information, and therefore to actors, ideas, opinions, resources, and so 
forth. We begin our analysis by sketching the concept of a multi-sided market and how 
it applies to Google.
Multi-sided markets
Microeconomics studies particular markets and focuses on the question of how resources 
are allocated based on individual participants’ decisions and interactions (Varian, 2010: 1). 
It holds that there are different types of markets that organize exchange in different ways, 
leading to distinct dynamics. The notion of a ‘multi-sided market’ has been widely dis-
cussed by economists since 2000 (Rochet and Tirole, 2006) and has been applied to 
numerous ICT and media fields.2 A multi-sided market consists of a platform that brings 
together at least two distinct groups of end-users. The attendance of end-users on one 
side creates a positive externality which makes the good sold on the other(s) more attrac-
tive, and vice versa. A platform that enables interactions between the parties can internal-
ize this kind of externality – that is, make profits (Armstrong, 2006). For example, a 
daily newspaper sells content to readers, but the presence of ‘eyeballs’ also constitutes an 
externality that can be sold to advertisers. In order to succeed, the platform’s owner has 
to get end-users on all sides ‘on board’, because the sides are linked: if one group is 
absent, the demand from the others tends to disappear. This leads to a ‘chicken-and-egg 
problem’ (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003): if there are no end-users on one side, users on the 
others have little incentive to get on board. According to Evans (2003), there are two 
main solutions to this problem: either to subsidize one group of end-users – this is what 
newspapers do by selling their product below its production cost – or to invest in one side 
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of the platform, as can be seen in Microsoft’s practice of spending heavily on tools and 
support for software developers to help them build programs that make the platform 
more attractive. If these subsidies and/or investments are well designed, powerful net-
work effects and economies of scale can lead to a situation in which the appeal of one 
side of the market is strong enough to capture the entire market on the other (Wauthy, 
2008: 49). This asymmetric ‘divide and conquer strategy’ (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) 
leads to ferocious competition between platforms and implies an important opportunity 
cost: by choosing to favour one side, the platform reduces its potential to take revenue 
from that side’s surplus. This is why it is essential to choose the ‘right’ side – that is, the 
one that exerts the strongest externality on the others.
Google Search as a three-sided market
Google Search can be described as a three-sided market. On one side, Internet users 
query the engine to find information, entertainment, and so on. On a second side, Google 
indexes ‘content providers’ that want users to reach their websites. On the third side, 
advertisers are trying to attract visitors beyond the traffic received from ‘organic’ results. 
Google subsidizes two of the three sides and charges the third: Internet users search the 
Web for free; content providers are charged neither for getting indexed nor for the traffic 
they receive from organic results; advertisers, however, pay for every click and thereby 
finance the platform. Because neither users nor content providers are billed – at least, if 
we do not count the extensive and valuable data they provide as a form of payment – 
Google can reasonably hope that they will get on board.3 Because users are present on 
the platform, advertisers have a strong interest in being there as well. In a way not vastly 
dissimilar from traditional media, the search engine provides an ‘audience commodity’ 
(Smythe, 1995) or, more precisely, what Van Couvering (2008: 196) has called a ‘traffic 
commodity’. Advertisers pay because visits can be either ‘transformed’ into product 
sales, influence, etc., or ‘resold’ to another set of advertisers. This is why media sites, 
themselves financed by advertisement, regularly advertise on google.com.
But Google also invests in the first two sides by constantly improving its indexing 
and search technologies to make sure they stay on board, and while the net revenue 
flow obviously points into Google’s direction, it is important to underline that the com-
pany spends significant resources on appealing to advertisers beyond simply providing 
‘eyeballs’. It does this mainly by persistently refining behavioural targeting through 
extensive data collection and by supplying a comprehensive set of free tools and ser-
vices: the AdWords platform provides self-service access and significantly lowers the 
threshold to becoming an advertiser in the first place; Google Analytics and the differ-
ent AdWords tools help with planning and evaluating advertisement campaigns and 
with understanding traffic patterns; and the AdWords Academy offers online and 
offline support and training.
Although Google’s founders were initially reluctant to use ads to finance their opera-
tions (Brin and Page, 1998: 18), the company has become the largest contender in 
online advertisement, attracting a remarkable 44.1% of the global Internet advertise-
ment expenditure in 2011 (ZenithOptimedia, 2011). Despite efforts to develop other 
revenue sources, advertisement still accounted for 96% of the company’s approximately 
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$35 billion dollars of revenue in 2011 (Google Inc., 2011). The core of this business is 
the three-sided market organized around google.com, which is emblematic for the ways 
in which the company uses complex technological means to manage its business 
relationships.
Ad auctions
In 2011, AdWords, the pay-per-click advertising system for the google.com domain, was 
responsible for two-thirds of Google’s revenues (Google Inc., 2011). Hailed as a particu-
larly ingenious way of selling and serving ads (Levy, 2009), Google integrates a position 
auction model (Varian, 2007) into the QRAM, where advertisers place bids targeting 
specific queries. But ads are not simply ranked into the available slots according to the 
amounts bid for a user click; an algorithm assesses how well each ad’s text and landing 
page ‘fit’ a query and this quality score feeds into the calculations determining both the 
placing of ads and the actual price paid by a company if a user clicks on their link. By 
integrating this score into the mechanism, Google can both maximize profits by ranking 
ads according to expected clickthrough rates – better ‘fits’ lead to more clicks – and 
coerce advertisers into adhering to the company’s paradigmatic vision on how users 
perceive advertisements. Google operates on the belief that users find large numbers of 
irrelevant ads distracting or invasive (Wojcicki, 2007), and has consequently designed its 
system to privilege sales price over volume. This is why localization, profiling and data 
analysis are prominent: if Google can serve the most ‘relevant’ ads to users, it can grow 
clickthrough rates (clicks per impression) on its own site and conversion rates (sales per 
visitor) on advertisers’ sites, leading to higher bids, and potentially making more money 
from fewer ads served.
Furthermore, the QRAM produces a fundamentally ‘strange’ commodity: not only 
are outcomes the product of complicated dynamics, but also their consumption gener-
ates value for the platform by providing automated feedback data that is used to tweak 
search and advertising. Both this double utility of behavioural data and the relevance 
factor for ad placements show how closely linked the search and advertisement compo-
nents have become. This logic has been extended further into the Web through Google’s 
strategy of ‘concentric diversification’; that is, through expansion into technologically 
similar markets where the company can leverage its considerable know-how. The three-
sided market built around the search service constitutes the financial, technological and 
data-stockpiling motor that fuels this transposition of the search/advertisement model 
into new markets and, most importantly for our argument, into ad network services.
The Ad networks
Although the largest part of Google’s revenues comes from ads on google.com, the com-
pany has continuously expanded its reach as an advertisement network. The AdSense 
programme, which provides a technical and commercial infrastructure with little organi-
zational overheads for publishers that want to serve ads on their sites, monetizes both 
clicks and impressions and uses a targeting mechanism that takes into account both visi-
tor profiles and page contents. While ads are generally created by advertisers directly 
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inside Google’s online interfaces, in 2008 the company opened the AdSense infrastruc-
ture to third-party vendors such as ad agencies. The acquisition of DoubleClick, also in 
2008, brought this two-layered approach to larger customers, with Google serving either 
as a provider of technical infrastructure for content delivery and performance monitoring 
or, through the DoubleClick Ad Exchange and the Google Display Network, as a direct 
middle-man between publishers and advertisers. While the majority of revenues flow 
from selling clicks and impressions directly to advertisers, Google invests heavily in 
providing technical, logistical and commercial services to ad agencies which handle 
large clients’ accounts and to publishers with their own ad sales teams. Formats were 
extended beyond the classic text boxes years ago, and now include multimedia, mobile 
and even TV ads. Having started out with services for micro-advertisers, the company 
has been working its way up to bigger clients by adapting its considerable expertise in 
infrastructure (serving), information processing (tracking and targeting) and intelligence 
(analytics) to the practices of a more traditional, less distributed part of the advertisement 
world. But by constantly expanding the reach of its products and services, Google plays 
an increasing number of roles that produce a complicated network of relationships 
marked by various conflicts of interest. As a publisher that serves ads on its own sites, 
Google competes with its AdSense partners, and as a reseller of advertisement space, it 
competes with the ad agencies that work with the AdSense and DoubleClick serving 
platforms. These are complicated and unusual relationships that are difficult to untangle. 
According to Devine (2009), the regulators approving the purchase of DoubleClick in 
2008 underestimated the implications of this acquisition and created the conditions for 
the emergence of a monopoly in the online advertisement market at large – a suggestion 
which seems to be confirmed by current numbers (ZenithOptimedia, 2011).
Our analysis will focus on the conflicts of interest resulting from this multiplication 
of roles that relate directly to the results page. If search engines are indeed mass media 
that shape our appreciation of the world, the economic incentives to orient search results 
are highly significant, given Google’s global market share.
Incentives to bias
The most debated critical question related to search engines is certainly that of bias 
(Diaz, 2008; Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000; Goldman, 2010). After a quick assessment 
of what is commonly addressed with this term, we approach the question from the stand-
point of microeconomic theory and show how specific incentives to bias arise from 
Google’s combination of search and advertisement.
Bias
The question of bias rises from the fact that search engine results are selected and 
ranked, and thereby ‘give prominence to some at the expense of others’ (Introna and 
Nissenbaum, 2000: 169). This is how they function as active ‘intermediaries between 
content and users’ (Röhle, 2009: 120), as ‘attention lenses’ (Grimmelmann, 2010: 435) 
and, ultimately, as media.
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A distinction can be made between systematic bias, where an engine favours certain 
types of sites by designing and configuring indexing and ranking mechanics in certain 
ways, and selective bias, where individual sites are promoted or penalized. The first type 
refers to what Grimmelmann (2009) has called the ‘Google dilemma’: a search engine 
that does not select and rank would be useless, and no imaginable mechanism could 
dodge the deeply political effects of information arbitration. There is no search without 
bias. However, one can certainly question a company’s design decisions and their ‘edito-
rial’ effects, and Google has indeed been criticized for its focus on the popularity of a site 
rather than the richness of its content (Diaz, 2008; Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000).
Concerning the second type of bias, one could imagine that competitors may be man-
ually removed or penalized, a practice that Google is regularly accused of. Over the last 
years, the company has conceded on several occasions that manual intervention is now 
indeed a standard practice. While manual removals or penalties have been publicized for 
some time, confirmation that individual sites are whitelisted for certain metrics came 
much more recently (Sullivan, 2011). Would Wikipedia be classified as a ‘link farm’ 
otherwise? In line with these practices, Google has started to talk about results in terms 
of ‘opinion’ (Metz, 2010).
This distinction between two types of bias largely covers the distinction between 
manual intervention and algorithmic design, but it is ultimately problematic, because 
search engines conflate the two in ways that are extremely difficult to get a hold of con-
ceptually and empirically. As Brin and Page (1998: 18) note in the annex to their paper 
on what was to become Google, ‘a search engine could add a small factor to search 
results from “friendly” companies, and subtract a factor from results from competitors. 
This type of bias is very difficult to detect but could still have a significant effect on the 
market’.
One consequence of this difficulty has been that investigators have looked at specific 
aspects rather than the full picture. So called ‘own-content bias’ – the favouring of sites 
belonging to an engine’s own pool of services – has recently emerged as a focal point, 
and empirical trials have indeed shown some preference for affiliated content (Wright, 
2011). It would be extremely difficult, however, to frame most of Google’s alleged anti-
competitive business practices, currently under investigation by both the European 
Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission, as wilful and abusive manipulation. 
We therefore propose a different approach that eschews the empirical question of which 
biases actually exist and instead asks which forms of bias would actually serve Google’s 
interests. In short, we propose to analyse the economic incentives that weigh on 
ranking.
Incentives and advertisement
According to the OED, an incentive is an ‘exciting cause or motive’ – something that 
‘incites to action’ – and microeconomics is as much an analysis of economic motives than 
of specific market configurations (Varian, 2010: 566–580). It reasons on the basis of the 
hypothesis that a company’s main interest is to maximize profits. While this goal may 
seem rather straightforward, its application is much more ambivalent in practice: for 
example, when it comes to choosing between short-term profits and long-term viability. 
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In the case of the three-sided market discussed above, the different interests and strategies 
of actors participating in the QRAM imply a constellation that introduces significant 
uncertainties for both actors and analysts. Microeconomists usually approach this com-
plexity through mathematical modelling, often reducing factors to an absolute minimum, 
which is not the correct path to take for the more general argument we want to make here.
Moreover, it is certainly not uncommon to think about media in terms of economic 
incentives. One of the principal axes of mass-media critique in fact presents reliance on 
advertisement as the main source of income as a danger to editorial integrity if content is 
adapted to please advertisers (McChesney, 2008). Given Google’s dominant position in 
both the search and advertisement markets, this critique does not translate well. In 2009, 
the company was estimated (Helft, 2009) to have between 1.3 and 1.5 million advertis-
ers, which goes a long way towards diluting the pressure that could be exerted by any 
individual company; additionally, Google takes the liberty to refuse a wide variety of ads 
(Diaz, 2008). On the contrary, content providers often believe that they need to advertise 
with Google to obtain sufficient levels of traffic. This does not mean, however, that there 
are no economic incentives to orient editorial decisions, i.e. selecting and ranking.
The initial critique of advertisement on results pages by media scholars focused on 
the separation between ‘organic’ and ‘paid’ results. While Google has, from the outset, 
insisted on a visual separation between the two, authors such as Diaz doubt that this 
separation goes far enough when paid links regularly show up in the same column and 
above the ‘first hit’ – ‘Google, after all, has an enormous interest in blurring that line’ 
(Diaz, 2008: 22). Machill et al. (2008: 596) thus point to the fundamental conflict of 
interest between user benefits and ad revenues, which leads to a permanent ‘balancing 
act’. Economists have approached the problem via the basic conundrum that ‘[h]igh 
quality search results have the potential to eat into a search engine’s profits’ (White, 
2008), because if organic results were consistently more attractive than ads, there would 
be little reason to click on the latter. Taylor (2012) not only confirms the resulting 
incentives for quality degradation, but adds that reduced competition further enhances 
these incentives, which ‘can thus spill-over into the quality of search services enjoyed 
by consumers’ (Taylor, 2012: 20). This means that, in this model, the balancing act will 
tilt in favour of advertisement revenues with growing market share.
The equation becomes even more complex if we take into account that Google derives 
profits not only from advertisement on its own pages, but also from its activities as an ad 
network and platform. In the following section we will therefore focus on incentives fol-
lowing from this double role, which implies that we consider organic links not only as 
‘competition’ for paid links, but also as opportunities for revenue in their own right.
Role multiplication and incentives to bias
To develop this analysis we need to distinguish several categories of left-side links 
according to their potential for generating revenue. We will then argue that there are com-
mercial motivations to treat these categories differently in organic ranking procedures.
1. Ad garden links point to other Google properties – the company’s ‘garden’ – 
where ads are served and user information is collected.
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2. Competitor links point to sites that provide similar services (‘substitute prod-
ucts’) to Google.
3. Ad affiliated links lead to sites that advertise on google.com via the AdWords 
programme.
4. Ad network links direct users towards sites serving ads with AdSense or 
DoubleClick, where both clicks and impressions provide revenues for Google.
5. Ad potential links reference sites with the economic resources to become 
AdWords or AdSense partners, but which are currently not.
6. Ad competitor links point to sites that advertise with a rival service.
7. Ad resistant links are sites that do not advertise and are not likely to do so.
This list could be further extended by including additional relationships between 
Google and other sites – from partnerships to personal contacts to multiple ad networks 
appearing on a single site – but these categories already point to the most systematic 
aspects. The first two link types concern the already mentioned critique of direct own-
content bias, as well as its flip side, competitor discrimination; for both cases strong 
economic incentives do exist, and the continuous allegations of anti-competitive behav-
iour indicate a certain level of public awareness. Ad affiliate links point to the ‘classic’ 
idea that media might have to favour advertisers to keep them happy, but it is difficult to 
see how Google would profit from providing ‘free’ traffic to AdWords partners by rank-
ing them higher on the left side.
If we step beyond revenues derived directly on the results page and consider organic 
results as opportunities for profit, the configuration becomes more complicated but also 
less contradictory in terms of ‘left side vs. right side’. Through its advertisement net-
work, Google is able to profit from the left side and there are clear incentives to favour 
ad network links, because there is a direct revenue opportunity if users are sent to a site 
participating in the AdSense or DoubleClick programmes. Commenting on the debates 
around Google’s monopoly position, the prominent industry observer Danny Sullivan 
(2009) underscored this conflict of interest by arguing that ‘the focus really should be on 
whether a company that delivers so much traffic to sites should also be one of the pri-
mary ways many of those sites also earn revenue’. A director of traffic acquisition for a 
large French news magazine, who we interviewed during the research for this paper, was 
very much aware of this situation and considered it important to be both a buyer and a 
seller on the AdSense platform – if only as a precautionary measure.
It must also be considered that links lead not only to individual pages but also to net-
work topologies. The potential for revenue maximization for every link could therefore 
be calculated according to users’ follow-up navigation opportunities. A page that is not 
an AdSense partner but links to one could be considered more valuable to Google than 
one that does not. This additional consideration shows how complex and subtle these 
matters can become, while remaining economically significant due to the huge numbers 
involved. The problem is exacerbated by the observation that users rarely venture beyond 
the first couple of results, making even small changes in position relevant.
Furthermore, there are incentives to reduce the standing of both ad potential and ad 
competitor links. Limiting the traffic these sites receive may push them into joining the 
AdWords programme to benefit from Google’s capacity to provide visitors. As we have 
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just seen, technological opacity and Google’s ambiguous role may simply generate a 
level of uncertainty about how well isolated from each other search and advertisement 
really are that is sufficient to convince companies to sign up when traffic is low.
Rather than favouring its AdWords clients on the left side, it is in Google’s interest 
to both widen its pool of advertisers and have them spend more. Besides further expand-
ing market share and ad targeting capabilities, this could mean directing organic traffic 
in ways that force content providers to advertise in order to gain sufficient numbers of 
visitors. The PageRank logic, with its built-in ‘the rich get richer’ dynamics (Rieder, 
2009), already makes sure that smaller sites have difficulty receiving significant 
amounts of traffic from organic results. For them, buying advertisement through a sim-
ple self-service platform is often cheaper than investing in SEO. Using ad resistant 
links to ‘clog up’ results pages is another way to reduce traffic to potential advertisers. 
From this perspective, the observed omnipresence of Wikipedia pages in Google’s lists 
appears in a particular light: while the seemingly ‘special relationship’ between the two 
sites has been much discussed, especially after the Wikimedia Foundation received a $2 
million donation from Google in 2010, the assessment that first place for Wikipedia 
means second place for somebody else has not been taken into account. Organic results 
are therefore relevant not only for what they include, but also for what they push out. 
This holds true for own-content bias as well: the more slots taken up by Google’s own 
sites, the higher the pressure for competitors to become advertisers.
If we consider search engine rankings to have ‘significant social implications’ 
(Goldman, 2010: 461), the ‘double oligopoly’ (Machill et al., 2008: 596) – which is 
becoming a double monopoly, with Google dominating both Web search and online 
advertising – creates a preoccupying situation where both opportunities and incentives 
to orient search results proliferate. While the specific configuration deviates signifi-
cantly from ‘traditional’ forms of mass-media dominance, Google has become a central 
normative force on the Web. And although its editorial thrust, embedded in code and 
practice, cannot be easily situated along well-known political lines such as ‘left’ vs. 
‘right’, it has clearly become both an arbiter and an interested party in the quest for vis-
ibility online. The logic of the three-sided market built around google.com, which we 
have identified as the foundation of Google’s business success, only fortifies this posi-
tion further by rendering competition structurally improbable.
Structural tendencies towards monopoly
In contrast to markets where specialization produces price differentiation and 
segmentation – a more expensive car is generally also a better car – Google’s subsidiz-
ing of the user side means that the quality of search technology and the price paid by 
users (zero) are not linked. We can therefore suppose that users will use the ‘best’ 
technology, simply defined in terms of user satisfaction, which leads to ‘winner-takes-
all’ forms of competition (Pollock, 2010: 15). The observation that markets dealing 
with information often show a tendency towards concentration is not new. In his foun-
dational paper on the economics of information, Stigler argued that ‘[s]ince the cost of 
collection of information is (approximately) independent of its use […], there is a 
strong tendency toward monopoly in the provision of information: in general, there 
will be a “standard” source’ (Stigler, 1961: 220). Pollock (2010: 18) correspondingly 
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concludes that a configuration in which ‘users care about quality but are not charged, 
while advertisers care about users and are charged, explains the highly concentrated 
nature of the search engine market and makes it probable that the market will continue 
to evolve down this path towards monopoly.’
Consequently, market entry has become extremely difficult: in order to compete with 
the dominant company on quality, enormous investments in R&D, infrastructure and 
organizational capacity are necessary. Even Microsoft, Google’s last global competitor 
in the search market, has not been able to disrupt the enormous economies of scale which 
Google derives from a mature platform with all three sides on board. Forced to provide 
search services for free, Microsoft uses the profits gained in another market to sustain its 
efforts to succeed in search. Ironically, advertising on google.com is part of the compa-
ny’s strategy.
To make things worse for competitors, Argenton and Prüfer (2011) have recently 
argued that a ‘peculiar […] type of indirect network externalities’ (Argenton and Prüfer, 
2011: 2) – query logs and the statistical intelligence derived from them – is sufficient to 
account for the ‘tipping market effect’ (Argenton and Prüfer, 2011: 20) observable in 
Web search since 2003: capturing and analysis of user behaviour improves search quality 
and, consequently, the search engine with the most users achieves technological domi-
nance, attracts even more users and again ameliorates the service – that is, the market 
‘tips’ over. We should add that analytical competences spill over into advertisement, 
because they directly improve behavioural targeting capacities. As a consequence, adver-
tisers have further incentives to join the platform: not only are users already there, but 
they can also be engaged more efficiently. While we consider the economic motivations 
to provide extensive user personalization to be relatively low, it is clearly in Google’s 
interest to collect as much information about users as possible.
For all these reasons, the outcome of a strategy consisting of fully subsidizing two 
sides of the market with revenues derived from the third one will inexorably be, if not a 
monopoly, at least an ‘almost monopoly’ (Pollock, 2010: 28). With Google receiving 
around 85% of search requests worldwide (ZenithOptimedia, 2011), this assessment fits 
empirical realities rather well – with the exception of markets like China and Russia, 
where national leaders continue to resist.
What does this mean? While Google’s market dominance is widely commented on in 
media research (Diaz, 2008; Grimmelmann, 2010), an economic analysis indicates that 
this monopoly is neither accidental nor simply attributable to particular merits or mis-
conducts of the market leader. Rather, it is a systemic effect of how this three-sided mar-
ket is organized, which should be taken into account in analyses of power relations as 
well as in deliberations about possible countermeasures. Furthermore, there is little rea-
son to believe that this situation is temporary: dominance in online advertising and per-
sistent expansion into new markets create a virtuous circle – ‘virtuous’ from Google’s 
point of view – where activities mutually sustain each other.
Conclusion
In this article, we have tried to show how microeconomic reasoning provides us with an 
analytical perspective that frames Google dispassionately as an actor motivated by eco-
nomic opportunity, rather than the missionary or hegemonic yearnings often ascribed to 
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it. In this light, the company’s monopoly in Web search and its successful attempt to gain 
what could be seen as a controlling stake in the online advertisement market are not 
explained by a particular zealousness, but by the company’s capacity to exploit the net-
work effects derived from the multi-sided market structure and the synergies between the 
two business activities. In a sense, Google is the logical outcome of the Internet’s 
unshackling of Stigler’s (1961) information economics from the limits which physical 
space imposes on the centralization of information services.
‘Googlenomics’ can be seen as part of a ‘broader re-negotiation of the boundaries 
between […] commercial and non-commercial’ (Röhle, 2009: 129), but occurrences on 
both sides of that boundary are equally affected. This means that, from a media and com-
munication perspective, analysis and critique have to adapt to a new situation in which 
money, power and visibility flow in new and complicated ways, content is managed as 
data, advertising is priced and distributed by algorithms and media bias is a set of param-
eters applied to millions of units at a time. From a regulatory perspective, it follows that 
‘[t]he agencies tasked with enforcement must recognize the limitations of traditional 
antitrust analyses when applied to innovative markets and consequently broaden their 
inquiries’ (Devine, 2009: 59). The conflicts of interest arising in particular from the com-
bination of search and advertisement services – and role multiplication through concen-
tric diversification in general – are clearly crucial here. For both media scholars and 
regulators, microeconomics can extend analyses of concrete configurations of power and 
identify control points, structural dynamics and crucial resources for argumentation. 
While we doubt that their proposal would suffice, Argenton and Prüfer’s (2011) sugges-
tion that search companies should be required to share query log data with their competi-
tors is an example of an original policy proposition that is directly derived from 
microeconomic analysis.
We hope to have made clear that the incentives weighing on Google’s ‘editorial 
engine’ are hardly comparable to those of other operations financed by advertising. 
Because incentives need to be analysed in terms of link topology and multiplicity of 
roles, their influence on results is inconspicuous and difficult to demonstrate. What 
emerges from our account is that Google’s mesh of tangled activities – as search pro-
vider, as advertising network and, through its plethora of services, as content provider – 
introduces strong motivations to organize search results in self-serving ways. Every new 
product the company launches, every new market it enters, only aggravates this situation. 
But even if we limit our observation to Web search, we can see that there are complex 
tensions between the left side and the right side, even if they do not fit the classic schema 
of advertisement critique. The founders of Google were keenly aware of this when they 
wrote that ‘the issue of advertising causes enough mixed incentives that it is crucial to 
have a competitive search engine that is transparent and in the academic realm’ (Brin and 
Page, 1998: 19).
While economists generally organize their normative arguments around the notion of 
consumer welfare, where the merits and faults of a market configuration are simply 
assessed in terms of their effects on prices, media scholars are concerned with welfare 
in a larger and more political sense. By taking into account micro and mezzo levels, 
economic reasoning can nonetheless help with developing a more robust analysis of the 
power dynamics that shape every single results page served. Even if search engines 
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deviate, in significant ways, from traditional mass media, we consider their capacity to 
‘shap[e] public discourse itself’ (Grimmelmann, 2010: 456) as sufficiently developed to 
justify the application of the same attention and care that characterizes our liberal 
democracies’ handling of traditional media industries, in terms of rights and responsi-
bilities as well as regulatory provisions and limitations. We hope that we have added to 
the groundwork for such a political and intellectual endeavour by sketching, however 
roughly, a political microeconomy analysis of a company that has come to epitomize the 
enormous challenge that the Internet represents to our understanding of what mass 
mediation looks like.
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Notes
1. This article cites a number of working papers from economics, an area in which working 
papers have become the preferred mode of publishing and often circulate for years before 
appearing in an academic journal.
2. The application of the ‘multi-sided market’ concept to search engines is not uncontested 
(Luchetta, 2012; Pollock, 2010), but this debate is largely internal to economics.
3. Currently, sites are automatically indexed, unless they opt-out via a robots.txt file.
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